DISCRETION AS DELEGATION:
THE “PROPER” UNDERSTANDING OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Gary Lawson*

The nondelegation doctrine, as it has been traditionally understood, maintains that
the federal Constitution places limits (however modest) on the kind and quantity of
discretion that Congress can grant to other actors. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
have recently described this doctrine as a “neurotic burden”1 on the legal system that
“lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources,
or in sound economic and political theory.”2 They agree that the Constitution forbids
Congress from delegating to other actors the formal power to enact legislation through
the Article I voting process,3 but they argue that “a statutory grant of authority to the
executive branch or other agents can never amount to a delegation of legislative power,”4
no matter how much or what kind of discretion the statute grants. They have recently
reaffirmed this stark view of the nondelegation doctrine in response to criticisms by Larry
Alexander and Sai Prakash;5 their latest declaration is that “the standard nondelegation
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doctrine has no real pedigree in constitutional text and structure, in originalist
understandings, or in judicial precedent; nor can plausible arguments from democratic
theory or social welfare be marshaled to support it.”6
The recent exchange among Professors Alexander, Prakash, Posner, and
Vermeule covers important and interesting issues ranging from the meaning of legislative
power7 to the proper interpretation of John Locke’s pronouncements on delegation,8 but it
does not engage the central constitutional question concerning delegation: does the
Constitution in fact place limits on the kind and quantity of discretion that Congress may
grant? Alexander and Prakash “have sympathy for the conventional nondelegation
doctrine,”9 but they make clear that they “have not sought to prove that the conventional
nondelegation doctrine is the one enshrined in the Constitution.”10
I seek to prove it here. I firmly resist Posner and Vermeule’s prescribed “course
of therapy”11 -- which seems more like a lobotomy – for the law’s alleged nondelegation
neurosis. As far as the original meaning of the Constitution is concerned, the traditional
nondelegation doctrine, while not always formulated by courts or scholars in the most
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felicitous fashion and almost never applied properly by government actors, reflects a real
principle embedded in the Constitution. Just as paranoids can sometimes have enemies,
neurotic legal systems can occasionally worry about real problems. It is a genuine
constitutional problem if Congress grants improperdiscretion to other actors.
This article demonstrates that the traditional nondelegation doctrine, at least in its
most general guise, has a solid constitutional grounding. To be sure, I do not defend the
dominant modern formulation of that doctrine that regards an “intelligible principle”12 as
the touchstone for a constitutional grant of discretion. Still less do I defend modern
applications of the doctrine, which effectively treat it as a nullity.13 I have elsewhere
described at length the precise version of the nondelegation principle that I think is
contained in the Constitution.14 As aptly formulated by Chief Justice Marshall nearly two
hundred years ago, the nondelegation doctrine distinguishes “those important subjects,
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under
such general provisions to fill up the details.”15 Or, as I have restated (without
necessarily improving upon) Chief Justice Marshall’sformulation , “[i]n every case,
Congress must make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary
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matters to the President or the courts.”16 But the precise formulation of the delegation
principle is not critical to this article. My point here is only that the Constitution contains
some limitation on the extent to which Congress can grant discretion to other actors; that
abstract principle is what I describe as the “traditional nondelegation doctrine.” Once the
principle is established, we can always, as the old joke goes, haggle over the price.
Accordingly, this article explains in detailhow statutes vesting undue discretion
in executive (or any other) actors exceed Congress’s enumerated power under the
Sweeping Clause of Article I,17 because laws vesting excessive discretion in the
executive (or in any other actor)18 are not “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” federal powers. Such laws are either not necessary, not proper, or both. They
are not “necessary” when they fail to have, as James Madison put it, an “obvious and
precise affinity”19 with whatever federal power they seek to execute. Even when such
laws are “necessary,” they are not “proper” when they charge the President with
16

Lawson, supra note 14, at 376-77. Both formulations, of course, sound absurdly circular. They are in
fact circular, but not absurdly so.
One can try to find alternative ways to express the distinction between fundamental and ancillary
matters, such as focusing on case-resolving power or demonstration of political commitment or
choices among salient alternatives, but in the end, one cannot really get behind or beneath the fact
that law execution and application involve discretion in matters of “less interest” but turn into
legislation when that discretion extends to “important subjects.” That is the line that the
Constitution draws, and there is no escape from it.

Id. at 377.
17

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”). Although it has become
conventional in modern times to call this clause the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” the founding
generation uniformly called it the Sweeping Clause. If it was good enough for them, it’s good enough for
me.
18

For ease of exposition, I will henceforth speak only of discretion vested in the President. The same
arguments developed here, however, apply to discretion vested in courts or other actors.

19

Letter of Sept. 2, 1819 to Spencer Roane, in 8 The Writings of James Madison 447, 448 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1908).

4

excessive discretion. The essence of the executive power is “the execution of validly
enacted law,”20 but a law that exceeds Congress’s power under the Sweeping Clause is
not “validly enacted” and therefore does not count as “law” that the President may
permissibly execute. That is what the traditional nondelegation doctrinerests upon , and
it is right.
Along the way, I will make a number of observations about Posner and
Vermeule’s interpretative methodology, which in many respects seriously
misunderstands originalism. To be sure, some of these observations are more than a bit
unfair to Posner and Vermeule. Originalists are creatures that come in many different
shapes and sizes – and those shapes and sizes are often fuzzy and shifting. Accordingly,
it is understandable that Posner and Vermeule would cast a broad net to catch as many of
these elusive and chameleonic creatures as they can. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable
to to ask them to tailor their tools and traps a bit more precisely to the different species
that they are hunting.
As anyone remotely familiar with my work can attest, I would not dream of
criticizing Posner and Vermeule, or anyone else, for challenging entrenched, traditional
understandings. The fact that a view is traditional does not make it right. But,
occasionally, conventional wisdom is conventional precisely because it is wisdom. The
nondelegation doctrine represents conventional wisdom in this sense.

I. Where Do We Start?: An Interpretative Introduction
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To use an example of which I have become inordinately fond,21 suppose that
Congress passes the Goodness and Niceness Act of 2004. Section 1 of the statute
outlaws all transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce that do not promote
goodness and niceness. Section 2 of the statute provides that the President shall define
the content of this statute by promulgating regulations to promote goodness and niceness
in all matters involving commerce and shall specify penalties for violations of those
regulations. As far as Posner and Vermeule are concerned, this statute seems perfectly
constitutional. It does not grant to the President, or anyone else, the power to vote on
legislation. It gives the President a specific, if open-ended, instruction; and to the extent
that the President follows the instruction by promulgating goodness and niceness
regulations, he22 would appear simply to be exercising the “executive Power”23 to carry
into effect legislative enactments. If Congress is exercising its legislative power by
enacting a statute and the President is exercising his executive power by obeying it,
what’s the problem? What, if anything, in the Constitution says that Congress cannot
enact such a statute?
That is the wrong question. The right question is: what, if anything, in the
Constitution says that Congress can enact such a statute? Congress, as with all federal
institutions, can only exercise those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. That is
what the principle of enumerated powers means.
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The second section of the Goodness and Niceness Act, which instructs the
President to define the content of the first section, is not authorized by the Commerce
Clause.24 That clause empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”25 The statutory
provision authorizing presidential regulations does not regulate commerce. It does not
(unlike the first section of the hypothetical statute) command or forbid any conduct.
Instead, it identifies a person who is authorized to command or forbid – i.e., regulate –
conduct. The only power conferred by the Commerce Clause is the power to regulate,
and a statute that identifies a regulator of conduct does not itself regulate. That does not
mean, of course, that the statute is unconstitutional. It simply means that constitutional
authorization for the statute must be found somewhere other than in the Commerce
Clause.
The obvious place to look for constitutional authorization is the Sweeping Clause,
which provides that Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [identified in Article I, section 8], and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.”26 Perhaps the second section of the Goodness and
Niceness Act is permissible because it helps “carry[] into Execution” the commerce
power that Congress has exercised in the first section.
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The Sweeping Clause, however, does not authorize all laws that help carry into
execution federal powers. It only authorizes laws that are “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” those powers. Is the section of the Goodness and Niceness Act
that authorizes the President to define goodness and niceness “necessary and proper” for
carrying into execution the commerce power?
I seek to answer that question by reference to the Constitution’s original meaning.
There are, of course, plenty of other ways in which one can try to answer it, but they do
not concern me here. Posner and Vermeule have sought to ground at least part of their
case in terms of original meaning, and that is the only part that I am addressing.27
In order to search for original meaning, one must know for what one is searching.
A number of originalists, and a somewhat larger number of non-originalists, often treat
the search for original meaning as though it was a quest for the subjective mental states of
some group of framers, ratifiers, or citizens. I do not. Properly understood, original
meaning is a hypothetical rather than historical mental state. The ultimate question of
original meaning is: “What would a fully informed public audience at the relevant
[original] point in time, in possession of all relevant information about the Constitution
and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean?”28 Such an approach

27

Accordingly, I have no comment on Posner and Vermeule’s policy arguments against a nondelegation
principle, nor do I care to engage them at length about the proper reading of precedents – although I will
gratuitously offer that their treatment of Chief Justice Marshall’s sophisticated reasoning in Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), is particularly problematic. Cf. Lawson, supra note 14, at 355-61
(reading the case correctly) with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1738-39 (doing otherwise).
28

Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American
Legal History 9 (2004).

8

“best captures the real nature of argumentation concerning documentary meaning.”29
Both in the eighteenth century and today,
people give reasons for their views of meaning, and those reasons do not
inevitably reduce to some method for adding actual mental states. Those reasons
can involve pointing out some feature of the document that one’s opponents have
not yet seen, or have undervalued, or have refused to acknowledge for political or
other reasons. In other words, they refer to mental states that would or might exist
under counterfactual circumstances. Those reasons can also, of course, include
reference to actual mental states; one can certainly invoke the numbers, the
eminence, or both of the proponents of a particular viewpoint. But those actual
mental states are evidence of meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning. That
is how dissenting voices on meaning can maintain, without absurdity, that they
are right and the majority is wrong. And majorities typically do not consider it a
full and complete response to any arguments about meaning to point out that the
dissenting voices are not as loud as the majority’s.30
In order to distinguish this species of originalism from other variants, one should perhaps
call it something like “reasonable-observer originalism.”31
Operationally, the difference between reasonable-observer originalism and
“intentionalist” approaches concerns the weight that is properly given to pieces of
evidence rather than the admissibility of that evidence. Reasonable- observer originalism
focuses on what a fully-informed, unbiased observer would have concluded after
weighing all relevant evidence. The expressed views of concrete historical individuals
can provide modest evidence of what a reasonable observer would have concluded, but
they are hardly the touchstone of an inquiry into meaning. Actual participants in actual
debates were not always in possession of all relevant information, were not always
unbiased observers, and were not always (given the real-world stakes involved)
29

Id.

30

Id. at 10.

31

For a more extended discussion of this approach, see id. at 7-12; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, -- Geo. L.J. – (2004)
(forthcoming) .

9

necessarily honest about their own thoughts or their perceptions of the thoughts of others.
This is true of all forms of expressed views, including statements or actions of framers or
ratifiers, statements or actions of legislators or executive officials, and statements or
actions of judges. Precedents, whether testimonial, legislative, or judicial, are relatively
weak evidence of original meaning. Such evidence generally pales before evidence
drawn from text, structure, interpretative conventions, and general background
understandings about language, the document in question, and the world in which the
document is embedded.
For intentionalist originalists, direct statements or actions of concrete historical
individuals are very persuasive evidence of original meaning. The same is true for
“Burkean” or “traditionalist” originalists, who see practices, and especially founding-era
practices, as good evidence of original meaning. For such interpreters, materials such as
“the records of the constitutional convention, the ratification debates, The Federalist, and
early governmental practice”32 may well be, as Posner and Vermeule describe them, “the
canonical originalist sources.”33 For reasonable-observer originalists such as myself,
however, such sources carry a lot of baggage relative to their probative value. To us,
“arguments from structure and ‘first principles’ can easily outweigh even very impressive
evidence about concrete historical understandings. Original understandings were not
necessarily original meanings.”34
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Given this methodology, the task is to figure out what the words “necessary and
proper,” as they appear in the Sweeping Clause, would have meant to a fully-informed
reasonable observer of the Constitution in 1788.
At least one thing is very clear: The words would have meant something. They
are not ciphers or embellishments. The Sweeping Clause does not say or mean that
Congress may employ any means whatsoever to implement valid legislative ends. Nor
does it say that Congress’s discretion is the sole judge of the necessity and propriety of
executory laws. There are clauses in the Constitution that actually say that sort of thing,35
but the Sweeping Clause, which refers to laws that objectively “shall be necessary and
proper,” is not one of them. The central question with respect to the nondelegation
doctrine is therefore: can laws conferring discretion on executive actors ever fail to be
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers?
Before we answer this question, one further methodological point bears mention.
Posner and Vermeule insist that proponents of the nondelegation doctrine bear the burden
of showing “that the Constitution contains some implicit principle that constrains the
permissible scope or precision of otherwise valid statutory grants.”36 This burden is
heavy, they claim, because it must overcome the inference against implied limitations on
congressional powers generated by the express limitations contained in Article I, section
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9.37 They have matters exactly backwards. Under the principle of enumerated powers,
all exercises of federal power must affirmatively be grounded in a constitutional
enumeration that authorizes the actor or institution in question to perform the relevant act.
Only if such an authorization can be found do we then ask whether anything in the
Constitution affirmatively prohibits the otherwise-authorized exercise of power. Grants
of discretion by Congress must find affirmative authorization in some constitutional
source. If that source is the Sweeping Clause, as it normally must be, then the burden is
on the proponent of federal power to prove, affirmatively, that such laws are “necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution” some federal power.38 The requirement in the
Sweeping Clause that laws be “necessary and proper” is not a limitation, implied or
otherwise, on congressional power. It is part of the affirmative grant of power contained
in the Sweeping Clause; the phrase “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” is
part of the definition of the specific enumerated power in Article I, section 8, clause 18.
The burden of proof is accordingly on advocates of limitless grants of discretion to show
that such grants are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal power.

II. Grants of Discretion Are Not Always “Necessary”

The meaning of the word “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause has been often
plumbed. The term clearly describes some kind of causal connection between means and
37
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and bill of attainder clauses, suggesting by negative implication that no other limitations should be
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ends: a statute is “necessary” as a means for carrying into execution federal power if it
bears a certain causal – or, as David Engdahl has termed it, a “telic”39 -- connection to the
achievement of that end. There has been much debate since the time of the founding
concerning the tightness of the required causal connection. Some founding era figures
such as Thomas Jefferson believed that laws under the Sweeping Clause were
“necessary” only if they were “means without which the grant of the power would be
nugatory.”40 Others such as Alexander Hamilton, as reflected in the preamble to the bill
for the first Bank of the United States, maintained that a law was “necessary” if it “might
be conceived to be conducive” to achieving legislative ends,41 which calls to mind socalled “rational basis” scrutiny in modern equal protection doctrine.42 Still others such as
James Madison thought that the word “necessary” as used in the Sweeping Clause
required something in between these two extremes; Madison described the word as
requiring “a definite connection between means and ends” in which the executory law
and the executed power are linked “by some obvious and precise affinity.”43
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At a very basic level, any debate about the strength of the required causal
connection is largely beside the point for present purposes.44 Posner and Vermeule
maintain that there is no case even in principle in which a law that does not transfer
formal voting authority to a non-congressional actor is unconstitutional because of the
kind or quantity of discretion that it confers. If there is even one instance in which a law
delegating discretion to the President would, because of the kind or nature of the
discretion involved, not be “necessary . . . for carrying into Execution” federal powers,
the Posner/Vermeule position is wrong. Posner and Vermeule accordingly must say that
the word “necessary” is literally meaningless – that there is no logically possible
circumstance in which a grant of discretion can fail to meet the causal requirement
embodied by the word. That is wrong even if one accepts the “rational basis” approach
of Hamilton. Under the Hamiltonian standard, it may be extremely unlikely that a statute
vesting discretion in the President will ever fail the test of necessity under the Sweeping
Clause, and it may be even more unlikely that a court will enforce whatever restrictions
the Constitution imposes, but the restrictions will still exist in principle. That is precisely
what Posner and Vermeule deny.
Posner and Vermeule could, of course, claim a kind of moral victory by arguing
that I have not described a “delegation” problem at all, but have instead described a “lack
of congressional authority” problem. Whatever. The basic idea is that the Constitution
places some limits on the extent to which Congress can vest discretion in the President.
Traditionally, that idea has gone under the label of “nondelegation.” It could just as well
go under the label of “exceeding Congress’s authority under the Sweeping Clause,”
44
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reserving the “nondelegation” label only for formal transfers of voting authority. I will
willingly grant Posner and Vermeule an academic trademark in the label “nondelegation”
if they will grant the existence of the constitutional principle that I describe. I doubt
whether they will take the bargain; Posner and Vermeule do not appear to be arguing
about labels. They want to say that the Constitution does not limit the power of Congress
to vest discretion in other actors.
But let us not draw conclusions too hastily about the effect of the necessity
requirement on thenondelegation doc trine (or, if one prefers, the Congress-cannot-vesttoo-much-discretion-in-the-President-under-the-Sweeping-Clause doctrine). If the strong
Hamiltonian take on the word “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause is correct, Posner and
Vermeule might still be in the game, at least as a practical matter. They are, after all,
clever people, and clever people can surely gin up causal connections that will sustain
even the most ridiculous statutes. Courts do it routinely.45 I will even help them out in
the case of the Goodness and Niceness Act: The statute delegating all practical
decisionmaking power to the President may well fail the laugh test as a “necessary”
means for carrying into execution the commerce power, but suppose that Congress
explains that the purpose of section 2 of the Goodness and Niceness Act is to relieve
Congress of the need to spend time on the specifics of commercial regulations so that it
can concentrate its limited energy on other matters, such as designating the precise paths
of postal routes.46 Section 2 of the Act, in other words, would be justified as “necessary”

45
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46

The first post road established by statute was:

15

for carrying into execution the postal power47 and the commerce power considered as a
pair. After all, the Sweeping Clause authorizes laws that carry into execution any powers
granted by the Constitution; nothing in the Clause says that each executory law must
uniquely map onto one and only one enumerated power. If the telic connection required
by the word “necessary” is loose enough, there may be literally no cases in which grants
of discretion, however broad, would fail the test of necessity. The word “necessary” in
the Sweeping Clause only poses a serious threat to the Posner/Vermeule thesis if it
requires a substantial enough causal connection between means and ends to have serious
bite.
It does. As an original matter, the “rational basis” standard of Hamilton has no
constitutional foundation. The textual case against the Hamiltonian rational basis
interpretation is simply devastating. Textually, it is linguistically bizarre to read the word
“necessary” to mean anything like “rationally related to.” Samuel Johnson’s 1785
Dictionary of the English Language defined “necessary” as “1. Needful; indispensably
requisite. 2. Not free; fatal; impelled by fate. 3. Conclusive; decisive by inevitable
consequence.”48 This is not the stuff of which rational basis standards are made.49

From Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia, by the following route, to wit:
Portland, Portsmouth, Newburyport, Ipswich, Salem, Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford,
Middletown, New Haven, Stratford, Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, New York, Newark,
Elizabethtown, Woodbridge, Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, Bristol, Philadelphia, Chester,
Wilmington, Elkton, Charlestown, Havre de Grace, Hartford, Baltimore, Bladensburg,
Georgetown, Alexandria, Colchester, Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Bowling Green, Hanover Court
House, Richmond, Petersburg, Halifax, Tarborough, Smithfield, Fayetteville, Newbridge over
Drowning creek, Cheraw Court House, Camden, Statesburg, Columbia, Cambridge and Augusta;
and from thence to Savannah * * *.
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232.
47
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Moreover, when the Constitution means to give actors unfettered discretion with respect
to means and ends, it knows how to do so.50 The words “shall be” that precede
“necessary” in the Sweeping Clause hammer home the idea that the clause means to grant
only a limited power.
Intratextual evidence is (if this is possible) even more devastating to the
Hamiltonian position. Consider the Constitution’s uses of the words “necessary” and
“needful.” Samuel Johnson’s 1785 dictionary cross-defined “necessary” and “needful”
as synonyms: one of Johnson’s definitions of “necessary” was “needful,” and Johnson’s
entire definition of “needful” was simply “necessary; indispensably requisite.” On two
separate occasions, including in the clause immediately preceding the Sweeping Clause,
the Constitution uses the term “needful” to define Congress’s powers: The District and
Enclaves Clause gives Congress power of exclusive legislation over all land acquired
from States “for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings,”51 and the Territory and Property Clause authorizes Congress to make
“all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” federal territory or property.52 Both
usages of “needful” involve contexts – federal enclaves, territory, and property – in
49
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97, 102 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke, eds. 1965), appears to be blather. I am not an historian, so I
cannot claim extensive familiarity with eighteenth-century discourse. But I have examined every usage of
the word “necessary” prior to or contemporaneous with Hamilton’s comment that appears in the
(considerable) database contained on the American Freedom Library CD-ROM, and none of those usages
even remotely conform to Hamilton’s. Samuel Johnson would, unsurprisingly, appear to have much the
better of this particular argument.
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See supra note 35.
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
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Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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which Congress acts with the powers of a general government and is not limited by the
enumerations of subject matter jurisdiction in Article I, section 8.53 If there was ever
going to be occasion for giving terms such as “needful” or “necessary” a relatively loose
construction, it would be when describing the legislative powers of a general government
rather than when describing the legislative powers of a limited government. The
Constitution appears to use “needful” when describing a less demanding means-ends
requirement and “necessary” when describing a stricter one.
There are, of course, also intratextual reasons to reject Jefferson’s extreme view
of necessity, notwithstanding its strong linguistic pedigree. Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland54 famously highlighted the Imposts Clause, which provides that
“[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
laws . . . .”55 As Marshall cogently argued in McCulloch,56 if “necessary” alone already
means something like “indispensable,” as Jefferson and the counsel for the State of
Maryland in McCulloch insisted,57 what sense does it make to add the qualifier
“absolutely” to the term? If the Constitution uses “absolutely necessary” to mean
“indispensable,” the bare word “necessary” must mean something less.

53

See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42
(1890) (Congress has “general and plenary” power over federal territories).

54

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

55

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (emphasis added).

56

See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414-15.

57

See id. 367 (argument of Mr. Jones) (defining “necessary” as “indispensably requisite”).
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That is all correct. The big question, however, is how much less than
“indispensable” the word “necessary” means. Hamilton is not the only alternative to
Jefferson. The textual and intratextual evidence in favor of a strict interpretation of the
word “necessary” does not simply dissolve in the face of the Imposts Clause; it merely
stops somewhere short of where Jefferson would have liked to see it. If one is to take the
Constitution seriously, the task is to find an understanding of the word “necessary” in the
Sweeping Clause that reflects the linguistic and structural evidence that points towards
strict indispensability but that also takes account of the intratextual evidence that sets an
upper bound on the tightness of the means-end connection that can plausibly be attributed
to the Sweeping Clause.
James Madison found as good a solution to that puzzle as one will find.58
Madison shared the concerns of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch about taking too
stringent a view of necessity, though he grounded his concerns in prudence rather than
intratextual analysis. In his 1791 remarks in Congress opposing the first Bank of the
United States, Madison expressly rejected Jefferson’s view of the Sweeping Clause. The
reporter described Madison’s position thusly:59
Those two words [“necessary” and “proper”] had been, by some, taken in
a very limited sense, and were thought only to extend to the passing of such laws
as were indispensably necessary to the very existence of the government. He
[Madison] was disposed to think that a more liberal construction should be put on
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It is hopefully evident that I do not invoke Madison as an authority, but simply as a very smart person
who happened to have the right answer to this question.
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The accuracy of early reports of debates in Congress is subject to serious question. See James H.
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(1986). The views of the Sweeping Clause attributed to Madison in the Bank Bill debate, however, cohere
with other, more reliably-related views.
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them . . . for very few acts of the legislature could be proved essentially necessary
to the absolute existence of government.60
At the same time, Madison warned against too generous a reading of the means-ends
requirement for executory laws:
The essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited and
enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental
means, any means could be used, which in the language of the preamble to the
bill, “might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the
finances; or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of
loans.”61
How does one navigate between the Scylla of Jeffersonian indispensability and the
Charybdis of Hamiltonian rational basis review?
Three decades later, Madison had the answer. “There is,” he said in a letter to
Spencer Roane in the aftermath of McCulloch, “certainly a reasonable medium between
expounding the Constitution with the strictness of a penal law, or other ordinary statute,
and expounding it with a laxity which may vary its essential character . . . .”62 That
reasonable medium, in the context of the Sweeping Clause, is to require of executory
laws “a definite connection between means and ends,”63 in which the executory law and
the executed power are linked “by some obvious and precise affinity.”64
This standard captures, as well as words can capture it, the nature of the causal
connection between legislative means and ends prescribed by the Sweeping Clause.
60

4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 417
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates] .
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1 Annals of Cong. 1947-48 (emphasis added).
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Letter of Sept. 2, 1819 to Spencer Roane, in 8 The Writings of James Madison 447, 451-52 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1908).
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Id. at 448.
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Id.
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Textually, Madison’s formulation conforms to the ordinary meaning of the word
“necessary,” which is not a term that one would likely use to describe remote and
attentuated connections. Structurally, it makes sense of the other uses of the word
“necessary” in the Constitution. Under a Madisonian view of “necessary,” the phrase
“absolutely necessary” in the Imposts Clause of Article I, section 10 means that without
congressional consent, States can only tax imports or exports if their inspection laws
would otherwise be unenforceable. That is a sensible, and even obvious, interpretation of
the Imposts Clause: it reads the qualifier “absolutely” to amplify but not fundamentally to
alter the meaning of “necessary.”65 The word “necessary” also appears in the
Recommendation Clause of Article II, which says that the President “shall from time to
time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration, such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”66 Given that
any laws ultimately enacted under the Sweeping Clause must be “necessary,” the
Madisonian understanding of “necessary” is an excellent fit with the Recommendation
Clause as well.
If anything remotely resembling Madison’s view of the means-ends requirement
imposed by the Sweeping Clause is correct, the nondelegation doctrine is very much alive
and kicking. If Congress wants to vest discretion in the President, Congress had better be
prepared to show in a direct and immediate fashion how the precise scope and character
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Consider how the Imposts Clause reads if one plugs in a Hamiltonian understanding of necessity: “No
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely conceivably conducive.” Not.
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U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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of that discretion is important to the execution of federal powers.67 Sometimes Congress
will succeed. Sometimes Congress will fail. It is hard to imagine, for instance, a
plausible argument, under a Madisonian view, for the necessity of section 2 of the
Goodness and Niceness Act. And any failure is enough to defeat Posner and Vermeule’s
position.
Modern constitutional law, needless to say, does not reflect Madison’s view of the
Sweeping Clause.68 But modern constitutional law bungles almost everything that it
touches. The Constitution’s original meaning is what it is, regardless of what courts, past
or present, do or do not say about it. Madison’s understanding of the word “necessary” in
the Sweeping Clause makes constitutional sense and other proferred understandings do
not. That is the end of the matter with respect to original meaning, and it is also the end
of the matter with respect to Posner and Vermeule’s theory of nondelegation.
As I have already observed, however, Posner and Vermeule are clever people. It
would not be astonishing if they found a plausible-sounding end run around even
Madison’s view of necessity. After all, the Madisonian standard is a standard rather than
a rule, and standards are notoriously malleable. It would be much more satisfying if there
was another route besides necessity for challenging the constitutionality of congressional
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It is tempting to try to relate the views of Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton to the tiers of modern equal
protection scrutiny, with Jefferson representing strict scrutiny, Madison representing intermediate scrutiny,
and Hamilton representing rational basis scrutiny. But that is a story for another day.
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It is more equivocal whether McCulloch did so. Madison obviously thought that McCulloch was
wrongly decided, but Madison may have misapplied his own standard. McCulloch clearly rejected the
Jeffersonian view of necessity, but it is less clear what view it actually adopted. Some passages in the
opinion seem very Madisonian, see, e.g., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422-23, while others are distinctly
Hamiltonian, see, e.g., id. at 413-14, 415. The point is irrelevant for determining original meaning; the
Marshall Court’s interest in the Constitution’s original meaning was tepid at best.
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grants of discretion. That route is the requirement under the Sweeping Clause that laws
executing federal powers be not merely “necessary” but “necessary and proper.”

III. Grants of Discretion Are Not Always “Proper”

A good percentage of my professional life has been devoted to the proposition
that the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause imposes limitations on executory
legislation different from and complementary to the limitations imposed by the word
“necessary.” The argument for this proposition was outlined in 1993 in an article coauthored with Patricia B. Granger,69 and a decade later I applied it to explain why the
nondelegation doctrine has a sound constitutional footing.70 The bottom-line conclusion
is that a “proper” executory law must conform to “the ‘proper’ allocation of authority
within the federal government ; . . . the ‘proper’ scope of the federal government’s
limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives of the states ; . . . and . . . the
‘proper’ scope of the federal government’s limited jurisdiction with respect to the
people’s retained rights.”71 Put as simply as possible, laws enacted under the Sweeping
Clause “must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of
federalism, and individual rights.”72
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See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35. For those who wonder about such things: my co-author is now
Patricia B.G. Lawson. We were married just a few months before the article came out. In this article, I
continue to refer to her as Ms. Granger to avoid confusion.
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See Lawson, supra note 14.
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The best way to see how this understanding of the word “proper” relates to the
nondelegation doctrine is to examine what Posner and Vermeule don’t like about it.
They have two basic objections: that the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause is better
understood as a redundancy rather than as a separate requirement and that even if the
word “proper” does independent work, it cannot ground a nondelegation principle. Both
claims are wrong. The word “proper” has independent meaning, and it precisely grounds
the traditional nondelegation doctrine.

A. “Necessary and Proper” means “Necessary” and “Proper”

If the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause adds nothing to the word
“necessary,” it obviously cannot serve as an independent source for a nondelegation
doctrine; whatever limitations the word “necessary” imposes on grants of discretion
would exhaust the substantive effect of the Sweeping Clause. That is what Posner and
Vermeule maintain. According to them,
Lawson’s premise rests on an idiosyncratic reading of the [Sweeping] Clause, one
which holds that the single word “proper” incorporates structural principles of
separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights as limits on Congress’s
affirmative authority . . . . A more plausible reading because a less dramatic one,
is just that the phrase “necessary and proper” is an example, among many in the
Constitution, of an internally redundant phrase. Consider other instances in
Article I, § 8, such as “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” (cl 1), “Government
and Regulation” (cl 14), or “organizing, arming and disciplining (cl 16). On this
view, “proper” just means “appropriate,” reinforcing the Supreme Court’s
longstanding and capacious interpretation of the companion word “necessary” as
meaning “useful” or “conducive to.”73
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
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In prior work, Ms. Granger and I spent a fairamount of time and energy
demonstrating that the words “necessary” and “proper” in the Sweeping Clause are not
redundant. We devoted, not one, but two subsections in our article to that specific
proposition.74 Most of the rest of our article implicitly explained how textual,
intratextual, structural, and historical considerations all support the view that “necessary”
and “proper” are distinct terms. The case for our position, however, is actually much
stronger than we let on, as the ensuing amplification will demonstrate.
The case begins, very modestly and quietly, with the venerable maxim that one
ought to try to give each word in a legal instrument some meaning. A construction that
renders a word meaningless or irrelevant should be disfavored.75 As Posner and
Vermeule correctly point out, it is easy to make too much of this maxim. Lawyers love
redundancy (as anyone who has ever read a contract or deed provision along the lines of
“give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey” can attest),76 and the Constitution was written
largely by lawyers. Although Posner and Vermeule picked really, really bad examples to
illustrate the Constitution’s willingness to indulge redundancy,77 there is in fact a
significant number of places in which the Constitution – for reasons of caution, emphasis,
or carelessness – contains duplicative provisions. For instance, at least some of the
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See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 275 (“B. ‘Necessary’ and ‘Proper’ Are Distinct
Requirements”); id. at 289 (“B. ‘Necessary’ As Distinct From ‘Proper’ ”).
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For the founding-era pedigree of this principle, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 564 (2003).
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See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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See infra XX.
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various specifically enumerated Article I powers to prescribe punishments78 are surely
duplicative of the general power to prescribe punishment granted by the Sweeping
Clause. Many of the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II, such as the Commanderin-Chief Clause79 and the Opinions Clause,80 replicate and clarify powers conferred on
the President by the Article II Vesting Clause.81 And as I have vigorously argued
elsewhere, the Bill of Rights was largely redundant given the original Constitution’s
scheme of enumerated powers.82 Arguments from redundancy must be made with care.
But that does not mean that they cannot be made at all. It simply means that they
must be made with care. For a number of reasons, a limited argument from redundancy
makes a good measure of sense in the specific context of the Sweeping Clause.
First, it is easier to find redundancy in the Constitution among provisions than
among words. The Constitution seems more willing to replicate powers or limitations for
emphasis or clarity than to replicate specific terms within a provision. That is not
surprising. In a Constitution driven by a skeptical view of human nature, and of political
actors in particular,83 one should expect to see provisions layered over themselves in an
78

See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (authorizing Congress “[t]o provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”).
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Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”).
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America.”). See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 46-47 (discussing the superfluity of the
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See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 189; Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights As an Exclamation
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26

effort to anticipate and avoid potential problems. It is not impossible for the same
considerations to affect the language within specific clauses, but that is a less direct way
to confront risks of interpretative error than is the construction of “back-up systems”
through redundant provisions.
The efforts of Posner and Vermeule to find examples of linguistic redundancy
within Article I provide a good illustration of this general constitutional tendency to
prefer redundancy of provisions over redundancy of terms.

Posner and Vermeule

cavalierly proclaim as redundant the language in the Taxing Clause authorizing Congress
to lay and collect “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”84 As Jeffrey Renz has ably
demonstrated, however, the distinction among these different forms of revenue measures
was actually enormously significant to the founding generation, reflecting a basic
distinction between revenue measures and regulatory tools.85 It is especially odd to treat
the phrase “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” as redundant when the Taxing Clause
itself distinguishes “Taxes” from “Duties, Imposts and Excises,”86 and the Constitution
elsewhere separately treats “Duties and Imposts.”87 In fairness to Posner and Vermeule,88
Madison agreed with them at least in part; in an 1828 letter, Madison declared that “[t]he
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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My strong suspicion (not quite rising to the level of a mortal certainty) is that Posner and Vermeule,
before announcing redundancy in the Taxing Clause, conducted an amount of research on founding-era
understandings of various taxing devices that asymptotically approaches zero. But I will be fair to them
anyway, even though they have displayed no inclination to return the favor.
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term taxes, if standingalone , would certainly have included duties, imposts, and
excises,”89 and the Constitution’s own usages of the various taxing terms are sometimes
hard to fathom. For the reasons documented by Professor Renz, however, Madison’s
basic assertion that the term “Taxes” is necessarily all-encompassing seems clearly false,
and a study of founding-era materials on taxation reveals persistent, even if often fuzzy,
demarcations among duties, imposts, and excises,90 especially between imposts and
excises.91 Strike one.
Posner and Vermeule are also much too eager to announce that the terms
“organizing, arming, and disciplining” in the Militia Clause,92 all have the same meaning.
An eighteenth-century observer would have been startled to be told that granting
Congress power over, say, the disciplining of the militia also granted Congress power
over the militia’s structure, command, training, and equipment. At the Constitutional
Convention, Rufus King explained that “by organizing, the committee meant,
proportioning the officers and men – by arming, specifying the kind, size, and caliber of
arms – and bydisciplining , prescribing the manual exercise, evolutions, &c,”93 which is
exactly what ordinary language would suggest is meant by the different terms. Strike
two.
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See Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 18, 1828, at
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For a brief elaboration of the distinction between the various forms of taxation, see Joseph A. Story,
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Posner and Vermeule’s third pitch is the provison granting Congress power to
make rules for “the Government and Regulation” of the military.94 This provision was
incorporated into the Constitution, without any reported debate or subsequent discussion,
directly from the Articles of Confederation.95 I frankly do not know whether
“Government” and “Regulation” mean precisely the same thing in this context – and I
venture to guess that Posner and Vermeule are equally clueless. There is, however, some
reason to think that the term “Regulation,” as it is used in the Constitution on more than
one occasion, has a narrower meaning than “Government,”96 though persons better
versed in the lore of military history than Posner, Vermeule, or I are better situated to sort
this out. Let’s give them a foul tip on this one and let the reader decide whether the
catcher hung on.
The point is not that redundancy of terms in the Constitution, and in Article I in
particular, is nonexistent or inconceivable. Arguments from redundancy or surplusage
should not be relied upon to excess.97 But they are a reasonable starting point for an
inquiry into constitutional meaning, especially when the arguments pertain to redundancy
of language within a clause rather than to redundancy of provisions across the
Constitution as a whole. The maxim that one should construe legal documents to avoid
linguistic redundancy had some power for the founding generation, and Article I of the
Constitution simply does not exhibit the kind of consistently carefree use of language that
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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Arts. of Confed. art. IX, ¶ 4 (1777).

96

See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 139-41
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Posner and Vermeule are much too eager to find. Moreover, the maxim was the linchpin
of Chief Justice Marshall’s rejection of the strict Jeffersonian meaning of “necessity” in
McCulloch. Without that maxim as applied to the Imposts Clause, the textual and
intratextual evidence in favor of the strict Jeffersonian understanding of necessity is
simply overwhelming. Posner and Vermeule probably want to think twice before
jettisoning this maxim too quickly.
The best understanding of the Constitution is that the use of different words
within a clause creates a presumption that the words have independent meaning. One
should not be startled to find that presumption overcome in particular cases – by, for
instance, evidence of consistent linguistic usage that treats certain terms as synonymous
or redundant. But one ought to start an inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping Clause
with a presumption that the words “necessary” and “proper” have independent meaning.
There is no consistent pattern of usage that overcomes this initial presumption.
There was in fact a fair number of founding-era figures, including such luminaries as
Patrick Henry, James Monroe, and Daniel Webster, who either argued or assumed that
the word “proper” added nothing to the Sweeping Clause.98 One of the nine definitions
of “proper” provided by Samuel Johnson would linguistically sustain the claim that
“necessary” and “proper” were essentially redundant.99 But the evidence demonstrates
that this was not a standard usage that trumps the otherwise governing interpretative
convention. To the contrary, there are numerous instances, from the ratifiying
98

See id. at 276 n.26 (identifying Henry’s and Monroe’s views); id. at 289 (identifying Webster’s view).
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4. Natural; original. 5. Fit; accommodated; adapted; suitable; qualified. 6. Exact; accurate; just. 7. Not
figurative. 8. It seems in Shakespeare to signify, mere; pure. 9. Elegant; pretty.”). The fifth definition
seems to reflect the same idea of causal or telic connection as is represented by the word “necessary.”
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conventions through the first few decades under the Constitution, of people treating
“necessary” and “proper” as distinct terms.100 Most of the definitions found in Johnson’s
dictionary, including the first four, reflect a very different meaning than could plausibly
be attributed to “necessary.” That is more than enough evidence to sustain the
presumption in favor of independent meaning.
Further examination of the Constitution confirms that “necessary” and “proper”
most likely have independent meaning. There are instances in which the Constitution
uses the word “necessary” without further qualification.101 At other times, the
Constitution uses the word “needful” without qualification.102 On one occasion, the
Constitution qualifies the term “necessary” with the adjective “absolutely.”103 On another
occasion, the Constitution conjoins “necessary” with “expedient.”104 The Sweeping
Clause uses the phrase “necessary and proper.” To an unbiased observer, this at least
suggests that the different usages might be meant to convey different messages. Perhaps
on close examination that initial suspicion will dissolve, but the Constitution’s pattern of
usage of “necessary” and similar terms should at least raise a flag that the pattern might
have significance. At a minimum, the pattern reinforces the presumption that should
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arise from the general interpretative maxim to try to give each word in a clause some
meaning.
Posner and Vermeule offer two responses to this evidence that “necessary” and
“proper” most likely have different meanings in the Sweeping Clause. First, they dismiss
the argument as “idiosyncratic.”105 Second, they claim that reading “necessary” and
“proper” as redundant is “[a] more plausible reading because a less dramatic one.”106
Because the charge of idiosnycrasy is substantively empty (idiosyncratic
arguments can be either right or wrong), I could easily let it pass. But, of course, I won’t.
A word of high praise such as “idiosyncratic” should be reserved only for positions that
deserve it; and while I am proud to say that many of my positions, including some that
involve applications of the Sweeping Clause, might well merit such a compliment,107 the
simple view that the words “necessary” and “proper” have distinct meanings, and that the
word “proper” incorporates some set of structural principles into the Sweeping Clause, is
downright banal. That view has been specifically endorsed by a large assortment of
scholars, including (and these are just the major scholars who I personally know will not
be offended by being named) Randy Barnett, Steve Calabresi, Stephen Gardbaum,
Richard Garnett, Mike Paulsen, and Sai Prakash.108 Less to the point for me, though

105

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.

106

Id. Yes, those are the only arguments that they made.

107

See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making,
18 Const. Comm. 191, 223-24 (2001) (claiming that the Federal Rules of Evidence are unconstitutional
under the Sweeping Clause).
108

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 145 (2003); Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 587
(1994); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism 74 Tex. L. Rev. 795, 814 (1996);
Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 79 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis By Statute: May Congress Remove
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L. J. 1535, 1568 (2000); Saikrishna Prakash, The

32

perhaps more to the point for others, the position has been specifically endorsed by the
Supreme Court on at least three occasions in recent years.109 As scary as the thought may
be, I am actually the law on this point. The Court’s most recent treatment of the question
in Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina simply assumes, as settled law, that statutes
enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be tested separately for both necessity and
propriety.110
Of course, any or all of the people who agree with me at an abstract level might
well roundly reject much of the specific content that I would attribute to the word
“proper,” including the specific view that the word “proper” holds the key to the
nondelegation doctrine. The basic idea, however, that the word “proper” in the Sweeping
Clause has something important to say for structural constitutionalism is now (and it
pains me deeply to say this) blandly conventional. This is hardly proof of the argument’s
soundness. But it does leave one wondering how and why the word “idiosyncratic”
cropped up in this context.
As for whether a reading is preferable if it is less “dramatic” than another: I have
absolutely no idea what Posner and Vermeule are talking about. If by “dramatic” they
mean “contrary to settled law,” they need both to read the previous paragraph and to
explain why drama of that character has any relevance for an argument concerning
original meaning. If by “dramatic” they mean “having consequences,” then I suppose
they are right that my reading of the word “proper” is more “dramatic” than theirs,
Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 737. Modesty forbids disclosing the full
results of my latest WESTLAW search.
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though I would be interested to hear them defend the proposition that, all else being
equal, one ought to prefer whatever interpretations of the Constitution have the fewest
consequences.
All things considered, an inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping Clause should
begin with an inclination to attribute different meanings to the words “necessary” and
“proper.” One must stand ready to abandon that inclination if the evidence so warrants,
but the presumption should be in favor of a reading of “proper” that complements rather
than replicates the reading of “necessary.”

B. Laws That Grant Too Much Discretion Are Not “Proper”

It is one thing to say that the word “proper” most likely means something
different than the word “necessary.” It is another matter altogether to specify that
meaning and to show that it bears on the nondelegation doctrine.
I have spent much of my career presenting and defending the view that a “proper”
law under the Sweeping Clause must respect background principles of federalism,
separation of powers, and individual rights. Some aspects of that view have been
subjected to detailed criticism.111 This is not the place to rehearse the entire argument for
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See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev.
581, 636-48 (objecting to the use of the word “proper” to refer to limitations other than means-ends
constraints); Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understanding, Modern
Misreadings, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 17, 46-140 (1998) (objecting to using the word “proper” as a source of
individual rather than structural rights). I have elsewhere responded to McAffee, whose criticisms are
largely (and wisely) targetted at the claimed implications of the Lawson/Granger interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause for individual rights rather than for its implications for structural arguments. See
Lawson, supra note 14, at 348-49. Indeed, if I understand McAffee correctly, he is likely to be on my side
of the present debate. Beck’s argument, as with McAffee’s, relies too heavily on history and not heavily
enough on structure and principles. Statements from individuals during and after the founding era, on
which Beck almost entirely focuses, establish the linguistic feasibility of the Lawson/Granger view of the
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(as Ms. Granger and I chose to call it) a “jurisdictional” interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause.112 One does not need to accept everything that I say about the Sweeping Clause
– such as its implications for Ninth Amendment analysis113 or for congressional statutes
regulating the judicial process114 – in order to see that the Sweeping Clause forbids
excessive grants of discretion. That turns out to be a relatively easy case. Accordingly,
the “short form” of the argument is sufficient for present purposes.115 Even the shortform argument, however, must proceed in steps. First, I demonstrate that the word
“proper” requires laws under the Sweeping Clause to respect principles of federalism and
separated powers. Second, I show that this requirement extends further than a mere
obligation not to violate express constitutional provisions. Third, I show that the
requirement extends even further than an obligation not to violate principles that are
intratextually and structurally derivable from the rest of the Constitution. Fourth, and
finally, I show that, under either the second or third step, one of the principles that must
be respected by a “proper” executory law is the principle against exessive grants of
discretion.

1. Propriety and Reasonableness

Sweeping Clause, but they are not the primary sources of evidence concerning the clause’s meaning. The
argument must play out in terms of textual, intratextual, and structural arguments, with historical data
playing a decidedly supporting role. I discuss Beck’s sole textual argument infra at XX.
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If the word “proper” is to mean something different from the word “necessary,” it
must refer to something other than the causal connection, or “fit,” between executory
laws and executed powers. If no such plausible meaning for “proper” is available, or if
such a meaning is available in principle but evidence of original meaning does not
support it, one must conclude that the terms “necessary” and “proper” are essentially the
same and that the Constitution uses two words rather than one merely for emphasis.
A plausible meaning for “proper” that distinguishes it from the meaning of
“necessary” is readily available. Samuel Johnson’s first definition of “proper” was “1.
Peculiar; not belonging to more; not common.” His second, third, and fourth definitions
were “2. Noting an individual. 3. One’s own . . . . 4. Natural; original.” In the context of
a provision granting legislative power to Congress, this would mean that a law that is
“proper . . . for carrying into Execution” federal power is a law that peculiarly and
naturally belongs to the national legislature. With respect to a legislature of limited and
enumerated powers that is situated within a governmental framework that is divided
horizontally by principles of federalism and vertically by principles of separated powers,
this would mean that executory laws must be the sorts of laws that would peculiarly and
naturally belong to such a legislature.
The general validity of this approach is demonstrated by a number of textual and
structural considerations. First, in the two contexts in which Congress does not serve as a
limited legislature, the word “proper” is conspicuously absent. The Territory and Propery
Clause grants Congress power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”116 The District and Enclave
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Clause gives Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever”117 over the nation’s capital and federal enclaves within states. The
difference in language between these provisions and the Sweeping Clause highlights the
fundamental distinction between a general legislature – which describes Congress when it
is legislating with respect to federal territory or property – and a limited legislature –
which describes Congress when it is legislating in other context. One would not expect
Congress, acting as a general legislature for federal territory, to have to worry about
federalism issues or separation of powers principles that are not specifically reflected in
the text – no more than one would expect a state government in an equivalent position to
have to worry about such things. This is consistent with the fact that the phrase
“necessary and proper” did not appear in any state constitutions prior to the federal
Constitution. The state governments were all general rather than limited governments,
which further points to the idea that the “necessary and proper” phrase is distinctively
tailored to the limited character of the federal Congress.118
Second, an understanding of “necessary and proper” in which “necessary” refers
to causal connections, or “fits,” and “proper” refers to substantive criteria, such as
proportionality and consistency with background principles, conforms perfectly to the
principle of reasonableness (as it is now called) that in the eighteenth century was at the
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The phrase “necessary and proper” appeared in the Georgia state constitution shortly after ratification
of the federal Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1789, art. I, § 16 (“The general assembly shall have power
to make all laws and ordinances which they shall deem necessary and proper for the good of the State,
which shall not be repugnant to this constitution”) (emphasis added). For an explanation of how the
intriguing phraseology of that provision further demonstrates the limited and limiting character of the word
“proper” in the federal Sweeping Clause, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 313-14.
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heart of English administrative law.119 The principle of reasonableness holds120 that
delegations of implementational power are always subject to the implied condition that
exercises of such power must be reasonable. In the classic application of the doctrine in
Rooke’s Case,121 Sir Edward Coke explained that sewer commissioners exceeded their
powers by forcing one landowner to bear the costs of repairs to a river bank that benefited
many landowners, even though the authorizing statute placed no limit whatsoever on the
commissioners’ discretion.122 Discretion, explained Lord Coke, “is a science or
understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between
shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences . . . .”123 In
other words, delegated power always had to be exercised in a substantively reasonable
fashion that took due account of the rights and interests of affected parties. Later cases
elaborated the principle of reasonableness by, for example, holding in 1773 in Leader v.
Moxon that a statute giving paving commissioners power to make repairs “in such a
manner as the commissioners shall think fit” did not authorize raising a street to such a
level that it obstructed a citizen’s doors and windows.124 William Blackstone, who was
119

For a more detailed discussion of the principle of reasonableness and its relevance to American
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one of the judges in the latter case, referenced the principle of reasonableness, and its
grounding in Rooke’s Case, in his Commentaries on the Law of England,125 which was a
primary reference source for Americans of the founding generation.
Drawing together the basic features of the principle of reasonableness, one can
say that it requires exercises of delegated power to be causally efficacious, measured and
proportionate, and respective of background rights. This principle constrains the federal
executive and judicial powers under the American Constitution even without textual
specification; the principle was part of the very nature of delegated executive and judicial
power in the eighteenth-century English legal tradition.
The principle of reasonableness, however, did not apply to Parliament (or to the
King in Parliament), because Parliament exercised inherent rather than delegated
authority. The federal Congress, of course, possesses only delegated rather than inherent
legislative authority, so if the principle of reasonableness is seen as a facet of delegated
power per se, the principle would bind Congress as well as executive and judicial actors,
at least when Congress was exercising implementational powers (as opposed to the
general powers of an unlimited legislature, which Congress possesses in some limited
contexts). But perhaps someone could argue, correctly or incorrectly, that Parliament
was exempt from the principle of reasonableness simply because it was a legislative
rather than executive or judicial body, in which case Congress, as a legislative body,
would similarly be exempt. A constitutional drafter who wanted Congress’s delegated
implementational powers to be subject to the principle of reasonableness would likely
look for some mechanism to avoid this inference. The obvious answer is language that
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makes clear that the principle of reasonableness applies in America to all exercises of
delegated implementational authority, including those exercised by the legislature. The
language “necessary and proper” performs this task quite elegantly.126 The term
“necessary” describes the element of causal efficacy, and the term “proper” (interpreted
in the Lawson/Granger manner) describes the substantive criteria, such as proportionality
and respect for background rights, reflected in the foundational cases such as Rooke’s
Case and Leader v. Moxon. The Lawson/Granger interpretation of the Sweeping Clause
reflects the principle of reasonableness that was a basic aspect of delegated power in the
late eighteenth century.
The only textual, intratextual, or structural argument against the Lawson/Granger
position of which I am aware involves the grammatical structure of the Sweeping Clause,
which
focuses on whether legislation is proper for the purpose of carrying a given power
into execution. The text thus appears to address the relationship between the
legislation and the legislative end in view, rather than, say, the relationship
between Congress and the states. This inference is strengthened by the fact that
the companion term “necessary” is understood to regulate the means-end
relationship.127
The argument begs the question. It assumes that the phrase “proper for carrying into
Execution” can only concern means-ends relationships, which is the very point at issue.
There is nothing linguistically odd about saying that a law is not “proper for carrying into
Execution” a federal power if the law violates structural principles or other substantive
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criteria.128 It is only odd if one starts from the premise that the phrase “necessary and
proper” only concerns the extent to which laws “carry[] into Execution” federal power
and not the manner in which they do so. That is precisely what we are trying to
determine. And given the presumption against construing the terms “necessary” and
“proper” to be synonymous, the fact that the word “necessary” regulates the means-ends
relationship supports rather than undercuts the Lawson/Granger thesis.
Textually, intratextually, and structurally, the word “proper” in the Sweeping
Clause is best understood as a substantive term that does not merely duplicate the causal
function of the word “necessary.” It requires Congress to legislate in a manner that
respects substantiveconsiderations . In the American governmental structure, those
substantive considerations include the prerogatives of the states and of competing federal
institutions. For a law to be “proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers, it must
be substantively reasonable in light of the Constitution’s scheme of federalism and
separated powers.

2. Propriety and Externality
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All of the foregoing, of course, is highly abstract.129 What does it operationally
mean to say that a “proper” executory law must respect principles of federalism and
separated powers?
The Constitution is full of express clauses that concern federalism and separation
of powers. With respect to federalism, for instance, the Slave Trade Clause specifically
forbade Congress until 1808 from interfering with the decision of states to permit the
importation of slaves.130 With respect to separation of powers, for instance, the
Appointments Clause specifically defines the role of Congress in appointing federal
officers: it providesno role for Congress as such in the appointment process, but provides
an advise and consent role for the Senate and a role for Congress in determining when
inferior officers may be appointed without the participation of the Senate.131 Perhaps an
executory law fails to be “proper” if but only if it violates some such express prohibition.
That would indeed give the word “proper” a meaning different from the word
“necessary,” but it would be a remarkably stupid meaning. “Oh, by the way, don’t
violate otherwise applicable provisions of the Constitution” is not an especially helpful
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injunction. That does not logically rule it out, but it does incline one to ask to see the
evidence that the Constitution contains such a ridiculous provision. There is no such
evidence.
Some arguments about federalism and the separation of powers, of course, do not
rely on express provisions such as the Slave Trade Clause, but instead rely on more
complex and subtle inferences. Suppose that one believes (as Posner and Vermeule, to
their great credit, evidently do) that the Article II Vesting Clause affirmatively grants to
the President the “executive Power,” which includes the power to execute federal laws.132
What if Congress now enacts a statute specifically instructing the President to arrest and
prosecute certain suspected offenders and forbidding the President from arresting and
prosecuting others? There is no express clause in the Constitution that forbids Congress
from doing this. But if the Article II Vesting Clause is a grant of prosecutorial power to
the President, itrequires relatively little by way of inference to say that Congress cannot
dictate the exercise of that power – just as Congress cannot tell courts how to decide
specific cases. When powers are granted to specific institutions within a scheme of
divided government, it makes sense to presume (subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence)
that the exercise of those powers cannot formally be dictated by other actors. Perhaps a
law can fail to be “proper for carrying into Execution” federal power if and only if it
attempts in this way to control power vested in other actors even when there is no express
prohibition against such control.
This understanding of “proper” would save Posner and Vermeule’s argument: the
grants of discretion with which the traditional nondelegation doctrine is concerned do not
132
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normally attempt to control powers vested in other actors. But there is nothing to support
this understanding of “proper” beyond the fact that it would save Posner and Vermeule’s
argument. Once it is admitted that at least some arguments from inference help define
what counts as a “proper” executory law, one cannot rule out candidates for such
arguments a priori. One has to ask in each case whether the particular argument from
inference does or not does not help define what counts as a “proper” executory law.
In the case of statutes purporting to control how the President or the courts carry
out their functions, the relevant principle is what I have elsewhere called a principle of
decisional independence, “under which each department should be understood to operate
outside the direct control of other departments unless the Constitution instructs to the
contrary.”133 No such principle expressly appears in the Constitution. Nonetheless, there
are a host of reasons why such a principle is more consistent with the overall structure of
the Constitution than is the contrary principle that would allow Congress to dictate the
decisionmaking of coordinate departments.134 It is straightforward and natural to read the
word “proper” to refer at least to these kinds of principles derived from the Constitution’s
internal structure. Perhaps, then, the nondelegation principle can be grounded in the
same manner as the principle of decisional independence; more on that in a moment.
The final question is whether the word “proper” can ever refer to principles that
are not directly derivable from other constitutional provisions. Posner and Vermeule,
naturally enough, think not. They claim that “ ‘proper’ has no work to do unless the
relevant constitutional principle can be traced to some other valid source of constitutional
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law,”135 presumably meaning some other provision(s) of the Constitution. The obvious
test case is a statute enacted in 1789, before ratification of the Bill of Rights, that
authorizes the use of general warrants to enforce the customs law (and, just to make it
interesting, further requires congressional pre-approval of all newspaper editorials
criticizing the use of general warrants unless the newspaper editors are Protestant). There
is no express prohibition in the original Constitution concerning the use of general
warrants (or regulations of the press or religion). Nor are there provisions from which
one can make direct structural inferences against this kind of law comparable to the
provisions from which one can infer a principle of interdepartmental decisional
independence. Would the law have been constitutionally authorized by the Sweeping
Clause?
One could, of course, object to at least some of the law’s provisions as not
“necessary” and hence as beyond the powers granted by the Sweeping Clause. But can
one kill the whole statute on the ground that it isnot a law “proper for carrying into
Execution” the customs laws? It is, of course, conceivable that the original Constitution
permits such a statute, from which we were rescued by the Bill of Rights. Many
supporters of the Bill of Rights obviously thought precisely this.136 But it is also
conceivable that the reverse is true. Many defenders of the original Constitution
steadfastly maintained that the unamended Constitution gave Congress no power to
authorize general warrants, regulate the press or religion, abolish the civil jury, or violate
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other cherished rights.137 The only plausible textual grounding for this position is the
view that a “proper” law must (as the principle of reasonableness would demand) respect
the rights and interests of the people – that is, that the word “proper” looks beyond the
four corners of the rest of the Constitution to background principles that shape the (for
lack of a better word) proper exercise of Congress’s implementational legislative
power.138 The question is which conceivable view of the Sweeping Clause is, all things
considered, a better view of the Constitution’s original meaning.
Is it relevant to this question that the founding-era arguments against the power of
Congress to provide for general warrants and such were not generally based on express
references to the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause? 139 Of course it is relevant – just
as it is relevant that founding-era debates were not filled with references to Rooke’s Case.
But the Constitution’s meaning consists of what a fully-informed audience would have
believed, not what the the actual audience in fact believed. If a reasonable observer in
1788 would have listened to my argument about the word “proper” and its relation to the
principle of reasonableness and said, “Yeah, that seems right,” then that reflects the
Constitution’s original meaning. The jurisdictional interpretation of “proper” dovetails
so elegantly with so many background principles and understandings that it likely would
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have commanded this kind of hypothetical consensus.140 Or, at least, so goes the
argument.
The nondelegation doctrine is a part of any plausible view of the Sweeping
Clause. If one limits the scope of the word “proper” to inferences drawn primarily from
intratextual and structural considerations, the nondelegation principle has the same status
as the principle of decisional independence: it is not a principle expressly stated in the
Constitution, but it is a better inference from the overall structure of the Constitution than
is the contrary principle. For fairly obvious reasons advanced by Alexander and Prakash
in their response to Posner and Vermeule’s thesis,141 and by Mike Rappaport in a
discussion that is (like most everything) given short shrift by Posner and Vermeule,142 it
is a far more plausible view of the Constitution’s structural and procedural provisions to
say that they limit the extent to which discretion can be conferred than to say the
contrary.
Consider just the structure of Article I, section 8. It’s first seventeen clauses
contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such actions as to “lay and
collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,” “coin . . ., regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,”
“establish,” “promote . . . by securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . .,
grant . . . , and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and maintain,”
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,” “provide for calling forth,”
140
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“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in
all Cases whatsoever, over.”143 At the end of the list is a clause giving Congress power to
make laws that are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” these other
actions. Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is supposed to be doing the lion’s
share of the laying and collecting, borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining,
regulating, fixing, providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising and supporting,
providing and maintaining, making Rules for the Government and Regulation of,
providing for calling forth, providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and
exercising exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over? It is really not very
difficult to reach the conclusion that a law that puts the substance of these tasks in
someone else’s hands is not a law “proper for carrying into Execution” these
congressional powers because it puts too much strain on the obvious architecture of the
document considered as a whole. The point is not that one can logically deduce, in a
strict fashion, the nondelegation doctrine from principles of federalism, separation of
powers, bicameralism, and checks and balances, no more than one can logically deduce a
principle of decisional independence. The point, rather, is that the traditional
nondelegation principle is more consistent with the government created by the
Constitution than is the nondelegation principle advanced by Posner and Vermeule. And
at least one function of the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause is to “textualize” these
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background principles to insure that Congress obeys them when legislating under the
Sweeping Clause.144
If the word “proper” imports the full range of background principles that frame
the powers of the limited legislature in a limited, divided government created by the
Constitution, it is even more obvious that extreme grants of discretion are out. How
could it be “proper” – or consistent with the principle of reasonableness – to make hash
out of the Constitution’s allocation of governmental responsibilities? One can, as Posner
and Vermeule have done, logically imagine such a regime. It is much harder to imagine a
fully-informed eighteenth-century observer choosing the Posner/Vermeule regime as the
best understanding of what constitutes a “necessary and proper” means for executing
federal power.
All that is left – and all that was really there in the first place -- is Posner and
Vermeule’s insistence that the Constitution’s allocation of governmental responsibilities
is purely formal: the President’s “executive Power” just means the power to execute
whatever statutes Congress enacts (and the judicial power presumably means the power
to decide cases in accordance with whatever laws Congress enacts). Those laws, of
course, cannot violate express constitutional provisions – the President cannot execute a
law delegating the formal right to vote or abolishing the slave trade before 1808145 – but
otherwise, they say, the Constitution has nothing to say about the matter.
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As should be evident by now, this is fundamentally wrong for two complementary
reasons. First, itbegs (or, more precisely, incorrectly answers) all of the relevant
questions concerning the meaning of the Sweeping Clause. The Sweeping Clause does
not authorize any conceivable laws for implementing federal powers that do not violate
express constitutional prohibitions. That is not what it says, and it is not what it means.
If a statute “for carrying into Execution” federal power is not “necessary and proper” for
that purpose, the President cannot execute it because it does not count as a law. A law
telling the President to go forth and promote goodness and niceness is no more “proper”
than is a law forbidding the President from arresting certain individuals, telling courts to
rule for certain plaintiffs, or (if one is prepared to take this step) authorizing the use of
general warrants in 1789.
Second, Posner and Vermeule’s position turns on the view that the “executive
Power,” in its law-implementing guise,146 is nothing more than the formal power to
execute whatever statutes Congress enacts.147 But they nowhere explain why this view of
the executive power is remotely plausible – much less more plausible than an alternative
view such as, for instance, “the power to execute statutes, provided that those statutes do
not put the President in the position of making rules for governance on important matters,
though the President is permitted to make rules on ancillary matters.” This alternative
view is exactly what the traditional nondelegation doctrine understands the “executive
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The “executive Power” has other guises as well, such as the power to command the military, to make
treaties, to govern occupied territory during wartime, and to conduct foreign affairs. See Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 28, at 47-51; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2000).
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See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1725-30. Under this view, if Congress enacts
unconstitutional statutes, then of course they may not be executed, but not because of any formal properties
of the “executive Power.”
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Power” to involve. That understanding of the “executive Power” has been advanced and
defended by Mike Rappaport, who argues that this narrower conception of “executive
Power” would have been seen as more plausible by an eighteenth-century observer
because it better serves the Constitution’s scheme of separated powers, bicameralism,
federalism, and checks and balances.148 Posner and Vermeule (weakly) respond that
statutes vesting discretion formally comply with this scheme because they must be
enacted in accordance with the Constitution’s presentment, bicameralism, and federalism
provisions,149 but that badly misses the point. The argument is not, as I have said, that
one can rigorously deduce a nondelegation principle from the Constitution’s other
provisions. The argument is instead that a view of executive power that complements the
background principles that underlie the Constitution’s formal lawmaking provisions
would have been more likely to command the assent of an objective, fully-informed
eighteenth-century observer than would the purely formal understanding of “executive
Power” advanced by Posner and Vermeule. Posner and Vermeule do not seem seriously
to consider the possibility that the “executive Power” (and the corresponding duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”150) extends only to statutes of a
particular kind and character.151 That is a grave mistake.
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See Rappaport, supra note 142, at 305-09.

149

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1751.
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U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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They do, however, raise questions about the extent to which broad grants of discretion would or would
not disserve the values protected by presentment, bicameralism, etc. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1,
at 1750. Those are not the right questions to raise. For whatever reasons, in order to serve whatever
values, the Constitution contains provisions that instantiate certain principles of separated powers,
bicameralism, federalism, and checks and balances. All else being equal, it makes more sense to assume
that other provisions that relate to the same general subject matter as these instantiating provisions have
meanings that cohere with the principles underlying these provisions than it does to assume the contrary.
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It is clear that the “executive Power” does not include the power to act without
statutory authorization by, for instance, acting as though there is a statute prohibiting
abortions on federal property when there is not.152 It is also clear that the “executive
Power” does not include the power to “interpret” laws in ridiculous ways by, for instance,
“construing” the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of adjudication153 to prohibit
abortions on federal property.154 The principle of reasonableness holds at least that
much. But if not everything done by the President in the guise of executing a statute is an
exercise of the “executive Power,” it is fair to ask why presidential action pursuant to
crisp, clear legislative commands cannot ever be said to exceed the limits of the
“executive Power” as the term is used in the Constitution. If a reasonable observer in
1788 was presented with the Goodness and Niceness Act, would he or she say that
presidential regulations pursuant to that statute were simply an exercise of “executive
Power,” or would he or she instead say that the power goes beyond the substantive
content of the “executive Power”? It is true that a Rappaport/Lawson view of “executive
Power” that sees it as bounded by certain exercises of discretion is less rule-like than the
purely formal view taken by Posner and Vermeule, but there is no good reason to think
that all constitutional provisions should be interpreted in the most rule-like fashion
possible. If the best understanding of the Constitution as a whole has the “executive
Power” stop before it reaches the power to make important rules for governance,
That is the true meaning of formalism: the provisions have meaning independent of the extent to which
they actually serve the values that motivated them.
152

On this, at least, we all agree. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 340; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at
1725; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1333.
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5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2000) (“ ‘adjudication’ means agency process for the formulation of an order”).
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See Lawson, supra note 14, at 339-40, 344-45.
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Congress cannot authorize the President to make such rules. And for essentially the same
reasons that the Sweeping Clause is best read not to authorize Congress to grant limitless
discretion to the President, the Article II Vesting Clause is best read not to permit the
President to receive any such grant of discretion from Congress.
But didn’t the First Congress grant precisely such limitless discretion to the
President? Posner and Vermeule have invoked, as did opponents of the nondelegation
doctrine before them,155 a series of statutes from the First Congress that vest considerable
discretion in executive agents.156 I dealt with these statutes at length in an earlier work.
Most fundamentally, I argued (echoing a much more elaborate argument from Steve
Calabresi and Sai Prakash157) that enactments of the First Congress are at best very weak
evidence of original meaning.158 Secondarily, I showed that most of these early statutes
grant a kind and quantity of discretion that is consistent with the traditional nondelegation
doctrine.159 The nondelegation doctrine, after all, does not forbid Congress from vesting
any discretion, or even a considerable degree of discretion, in other agents. It permits
Congress to grant discretion with respect to matters ancillary to a statutory scheme, but
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See 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 (3d
ed. 1994).
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1735-36; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1340.
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Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 108, at 551-59.
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See Lawson, supra note 14, at 398:
Enactments of early Congresses are particularly suspect because members of Congress, even those
who participated in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, are not disinterested observers.
They are political actors, responding to political as well as legal influences, who are eminently
capable of making mistakes about the meaning of the Constitution. Their work product constitutes
post-enactment legislative history that ranks fairly low down on the hierarchy of reliable evidence
concerning original meaning.
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See id. at 396-402.
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forbids grants of discretion on fundamental matters. The First Congress generally
conformed to this principle. The few statutes that do not seem consistent with the
traditional nondelegation doctrine are no threat to the nondelegation doctrine because
they either involve subjects, such as military or foreign affairs matters, in which the
Constitution permits Congress to grant the President more than the usual measure of
discretion160 or represent mistakes committed by a fallible First Congress.
Posner and Vermeule are unconvinced. Without disputing the general
methodological objection to heavy reliance on early legislative enactments, they claim
that because “[a]ll of the affirmative originalist evidence for the delegation metaphor . . .
is also post-ratification material . . . [,] [t]o take Lawson’s objection seriously is to wipe
out all of the affirmative founding-era evidence that nondelegation proponents
possess.”161 Posner and Vermeule have a strange understanding of what counts as
“affirmative originalist evidence.”162 The argument for the nondelegation doctrine that I
have constructed, here and elsewhere, does not rely at all on “snippets from Madison and
early legislators.”163 Nor could it, given my methodological predilections. Such
statements are (even if only barely) admissible evidence of original meaning, but they are
hardly the focus of argument for a reasonable-observer originalist. The “affirmative
originalist evidence” for the nondelegation doctrine consists precisely of the arguments
from text, structure, and principle that point towards a construction of the Sweeping
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See Rappaport, supra note 142, at 310, 346-53.
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1736 n.61.
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They also have a mistaken view about exactly who has the burden of producing affirmative evidence
on this point. See supra XX.
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Id. I made that very clear in my last article on this subject. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 341 n.51.
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Clause (and the Article II Vesting Clause) that limits the extent to which Congress may
confer discretion on the President. That argument does not rely, in any fundamental
sense, on evidence of concrete historial understandings, from the First Congress or
otherwise.
With respect to the substance of the statutes, Posner and Vermeule retreat to their
favorite redoubt: the ad hominem. “Nondelegation proponents,” they exclaim, “may chip
away at the early statutes as much as they please, adding ingenious epicycles to square
the statutes with the theory, but the cumulative impression that these statutes create is that
early Congresses just didn’t take constitutional objections to delegation very
seriously.”164 I confess to being quite fond of the “ingenious epicycles” label – the
epicycles, of course, were astoundingly accurate as tools for predicting planetary motions
in all but the most extreme cases – but I am a bit less willing to accept the
characterization of a detailed, painstaking four-page discussion of founding-era statutes,
superimposed upon another entire article that further addresses some of these statutes,165
as an attempt to “chip away” at anything. I rather think that, between us, Mike Rappaport
and I smoked their claims about founding-era statutespretty thoroughly . The point,
however, is of only of minor interest as far as original meaning is concerned.166

IV. (Very Brief) Concluding Remarks
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1737 n.61.
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See Rappaport, supra note 142.
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Of even less interest, I suppose, is evidence from the Second Congress showing deep constitutional
concern on the part of some Members about delegations of broad authority to the President with respect to
the location of post roads. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 402-03. Posner and Vermeule do not appear to
have anything to say about this evidence.
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The evidence from text, intratextual analysis, structure, and background
principles that forms the bedrock of any good (reasonable-observer) originalist argument
overwhelmingly shows that the Constitution imposes limits on the extent to which
Congress can grant discretion to other actors. That leaves the difficult task of figuring
out exactly how much and what kind of discretion Congress may grant.167 But that task,
rather than the burial of the nondelegation doctrine, is the task set upon us by the
Constitution.
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For my lengthy crack at this task, see id. at 353-95.
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